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Abstract 
International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these 
organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing 
countries in its ability to mandate far-ranging policy reforms—so-called ‘conditionalities’—in 
exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti-
corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures such as the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises can create rent-extraction opportunities and limit the capacity 
of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental-
variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing 
countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state-owned enterprises exert large 
detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not 
consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design 
of conditionality, which should avoid large-scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak 
accountability. 
Keywords: International Monetary Fund; IMF program; corruption; anti-corruption conditionality; 
privatization of state-owned enterprises  
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1.  Introduction  
Corruption—the misuse of public office for private gain (World Bank 1997, 8)—is widely 
considered an obstacle to development, as it dampens economic growth and lowers the quality of 
public service provision, with follow-on implications for education, health, and the environment 
(Mauro 1995; Persson and Rothstein 2015; Welsch 2004). Consequently, it is no surprise that 
corruption abatement has moved center-stage in international policy debates. Among the 
international organizations promoting anti-corruption reforms, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)—an international financial institution (IFI) mandated to uphold global financial stability—
holds an influential position. In its capacity as a global lender of last resort, the IMF provides 
financial assistance to countries in exchange for the introduction of far-ranging policy reforms 
(so-called ‘conditionalities’). These reforms require governments to cut public expenditure, 
privatize state-owned assets, liberalize markets, and deregulate prices (Babb and Kentikelenis 
2018; Copelovitch 2010; Stone 2002). 
While the primary rationale of such reforms is to foster economic growth, a secondary objective is 
to promote, broadly, ‘good governance’ and, more narrowly, to abate corruption by eliminating 
rent-seeking opportunities (Abed and Davoodi 2000; Abed and Gupta 2002; Gaspar and Hagan 
2016; IMF 2017; Tanzi 1998). IMF country staff have argued that their “policies to promote 
deregulation, liberalization, and privatization have aimed at creating an environment less 
conducive to corruption” (Wolf and Gürgen 2000). Furthermore, IMF researchers have argued 
that “mediocre growth” in the Middle East and Central Asia was attributable in part to corruption, 
which, in turn, was rooted in large “patronage-ridden state-owned enterprises, complex business 
regulations and tax codes, and bureaucratic red tape” (Mitra et al. 2016, 22). In a recent IMF 
policy report on ‘The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues’, the Fund reaffirms its critical view 
on state-owned enterprises with “governance structures” prone to “political interference” (IMF 
2017, 18).  
While the view that market-liberalizing reforms can abate corruption has gained currency among 
IMF policymakers, the underlying evidence base is thin. At best, the track-record of market-
liberalizing reforms in abating corruption is mixed. Some studies find that free-market policies 
like trade openness and market deregulation are associated with lower corruption (Gerring and 
Thacker 2005; Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose 2007; Sandholtz and Gray 2003). However, a 
significant body of research also demonstrates the corruption-inducing impact of another common 
market-liberalizing reform: the privatization of state-owned enterprises. In post-Soviet transition 
countries, IMF programs mandated mass privatizations which increased corruption, as managers 
with good connections to the authorities appropriated many of the former public enterprises 
(Hamm, King, and Stuckler 2012; Stone 2002; Wedel 2001). Similar cases of increased corruption 
in the wake of privatization were documented in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and East 
Asia (Manzetti and Blake 1996; Mwenda and Tangri 2005; Painter 2005).  
In light of this evidence, we scrutinize the corruption-abating effect of privatization, using new 
data and advanced statistical methods to complement existing research based on case studies. We 
argue that privatization generates new opportunities for corruption, specifically in an environment 
of asymmetric information in which insiders can exploit their information advantage to acquire 
newly-privatized state assets, to the detriment of bidders who lack informal contacts to 
privatization decision-makers (Martimort and Straub 2009). As this quid-pro-quo—insiders 
obtaining favorable treatment in the bidding process in exchange for bribing officials with 
decision-making authority—is illegal, the actors involved have incentives to cover the trails of 
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corrupt activities. In particular, they have incentives to weaken institutions which threaten to 
uncover their corrupt activities, unwind corrupt deals, and impose additional punishments. Yet, if 
enough individuals have been corrupt, they make others more easily corruptible because the 
returns to honest behavior in an environment of weak institutions have decreased. The result is a 
vicious spiral of increased corruption and weakening institutions (Hoff and Stiglitz 2005).  
We test our argument using panel data for up to 141 countries in the 1982-2014 period. To count 
the number of privatization conditions in IMF programs, we use a new dataset on IMF 
conditionality from 1980 to 2014 based on original coding of the Letters of Intent and associated 
Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies between the Fund and its borrowers 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). In addition, this dataset includes information on all major 
areas of market-liberalizing reform, which enables testing of more hypotheses compared to 
narrower datasets (Rickard and Caraway 2018; Wei and Zhang 2010; Woo 2013). 
Methodologically, we rely on an instrumental-variable research design to account for potential 
endogeneity of IMF conditionality, while at the same time correcting for potential bias arising 
from non-random selection into IMF programs (Stubbs et al. 2018). This methodological strategy 
allows for a causal interpretation of our main results. We find that privatization conditions have a 
large corruption-inducing effect. This effect holds for alternative indicators of corruption, such as 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption control index and the Varieties of 
Democracy (VDem) corruption index. Conversely, the evidence on conditions aimed explicitly at 
reducing corruption is less conclusive. While market-liberalizing reforms may reduce corruption 
in the short term, they tend to be detrimental in the long term. Overall, these results challenge the 
IMF’s ‘house view’ that structural conditions are uniformly beneficial for corruption abatement.  
Our article contributes to several key debates in social-scientific research. In particular, it 
contributes to cross-country large-N studies examining determinants of corruption. Most studies 
focus on slow-moving factors (Fréchette 2006; Jetter, Agudelo, and Hassan 2015; Treisman 
2000), while others emphasize market-liberalizing policies (Gerring and Thacker 2005; Hopkin 
and Rodríguez-Pose 2007; Sandholtz and Gray 2003). We extend this line of inquiry by adding 
the role of IFIs as agents of market-liberalizing policy reform. By focusing on privatization, we 
further disaggregate market-liberalizing policies. Our study also holds promise for stronger 
inference by focusing on those policy reforms mandated by powerful IFIs rather than chosen by 
governments for unobserved reasons. 
Our article also relates to studies on corruption in particular geographical regions, including 
Central and Eastern Europe (Batory 2012; Dimitrova 2010; Falkner and Treib 2008; Fazekas and 
King 2018) as well as Latin America (Manzetti and Blake 1996; Martimort and Straub 2009; 
Martinez-Gallardo and Murillo 2011). Notwithstanding distinct regional variation in patterns of 
corruption control, our results suggest a universal mechanism by which IFI-mandated 
privatization shocks let individuals reconsider the benefits and costs of corruption and their 
preferences for weak institutions. The results also suggest that IMF practice did little to change 
prevailing norms with a view to delegitimize corruption. To the contrary, the Fund long pushed 
for privatization even when existing institutions were weak, and despite such reforms requiring 
regulatory constraints to be successful (Dubash and Morgan 2012; Prakash and Potoski 2016; 
Stiglitz 2003).  
Further, our work contributes to the more general issue of how international organizations affect 
the regulatory capacity of states in an era of ‘hyper-globalization’ (Rodrik 2011). High-income 
countries embraced market liberalism but—to some extent—weathered the pressures of 
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globalization by establishing a form of ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite and Dahos 2000; 
Levi-Faur 2005; Phillips 2006). In developing countries, however, powerful IFIs have 
successfully pushed for deregulation because states lacked the capacity to resist such pressures 
and re-regulate markets (Babb and Kentikelenis 2018; Reinsberg et al. 2018). What is more, IFIs 
often transplanted ‘regulatory innovations’ from the developed world into developing countries, 
with insufficient embedding in local contexts (Dubash and Morgan 2012; Dunning 2004; Prakash 
and Potoski 2016). Confirming these arguments, our results caution against an overly optimistic 
view on the role of international organizations as facilitators of ‘responsive regulators’ (Abbott 
and Snidal 2013)—arguably because IFIs are not well-equipped to perform the role of 
orchestrators. Finally, our study also complements research on the socio-economic consequences 
of IMF programs (Dreher 2006; Kentikelenis 2017; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Reinsberg et 
al. 2018; Vreeland 2003). To date, no study has investigated the link between IMF conditionalities 
and corruption. And while past research assumed homogeneous effects of IMF programs, we 
allow for heterogeneity of IMF programs by scrutinizing specifically privatization conditions in 
such programs and addressing the methodological challenges related to non-random assignment 
of IMF conditions (Stubbs et al. 2018).  
 
2.  The corruption-inducing impact of privatization  
The privatization-corruption link 
We hypothesize that privatization can induce corruption by creating new rents and unleashing a 
political-economic dynamic that weakens the institutions of corruption control. Our argument 
unfolds in three steps. First, we posit that privatization processes create rent opportunities that can 
be exploited, especially under conditions of asymmetric information. Second, we show how the 
(illegal) pursuit of such rents generates incentives for weak institutions among rent-seeking elites. 
Third, we derive the dynamic implication that institutions deteriorate further as a result of a 
collective-action dilemma in post-privatization societies.   
While there are different modes to privatize state-owned assets (Irdam, Scheiring, and King 
2015), they can all lead to creating economic rents by putting public assets up for sale, and to 
generating large amounts of concentrated revenue which is appropriable by individual actors 
(Gray and Kaufman 1998). Corruption opportunities exist along the entire privatization process, 
from inception, to tender, and sale of public assets, and they likely are larger when the 
administrators of the former system manage the privatization schemes (Martimort and Straub 
2009; Rose-Ackerman 2002; Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005).  
Information asymmetries facilitate rent appropriation and leave ample space for corruption. In 
particular, outsiders have less information than insiders such as managers and public officials, 
who can exploit this informational advantage to enrich themselves in this process (Tanzi 1998, 7). 
For example, managers and firm insiders with vested interests make deliberate attempts to falsify 
records and undervalue firms in order to purchase them at bargain prices (Hamm, King, and 
Stuckler 2012, 317). Bidders can offer decision-makers side-payments to increase their chances of 
winning or preserving monopoly rents of former state-owned enterprises (Rose-Ackerman 2002).  
Once corrupt individuals have acquired assets in the process, they seek to protect these assets and 
forego punishment by the state. Within the existing institutional framework, rent-seekers could 
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bribe a public official in exchange for favorable treatment (Martimort and Straub 2009). From the 
perspective of corrupt elites, a more effective strategy would be to sustain—if not weaken—the 
institutions that could threaten to punish their corrupt behavior—if it was detected at all. Political 
institutions are not given but evolve in accordance with collective decisions within societies to 
alter them. In the short term, privatization can reduce corruption control because individuals who 
want to enrich themselves and to reduce the probability of detection and subsequent punishment 
of corruption are better able to do so under weak institutions, which lowers their instantaneous 
demand for strong institution (Ganev 2007). Even if most individuals are not corrupt, attempts to 
weaken institutions under incomplete information can lead to a situation in which weak 
institutions and high corruption become entrenched. To be sure, all individuals with control over 
productive assets are better off investing into these assets in a rule-of-law state rather than 
stripping assets in a lawless environment. However, the more individuals have already stripped 
assets, the smaller the expected constituency for a rule-of-law state, which makes investment into 
productive assets and voting for strong institutions less beneficial, even for non-corrupt 
individuals. Hence, individuals collectively choose inefficient institutions because they fail to 
internalize the effect of their economic choices on the institutional environment (Hoff and Stiglitz 
2005). This game-theoretic logic resembles recent accounts of corruption as a collective action 
dilemma (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). 
In sum, our model provides a mechanism for understanding how privatization reduces corruption 
control in a society. It also generates the dynamic expectation that corruption control declines 
further within the process of privatization (unless exogenous factors break the vicious circle of 
rent-seeking and weakening institutions). This implies our main hypothesis: Privatization is 
negatively associated with corruption control.  
Case-study evidence on the privatization-corruption link 
Qualitative evidence on the corruption-inducing effects of privatization is abundant. In the former 
Soviet Union countries, managers with good connections to the authorities purchased many 
former public enterprises (Hellmann and Kaufmann 2001; Hoff and Stiglitz 2005; Stone 2002). 
During Soviet times, “patronage was rampant but blatant forms of corruption were kept in check 
by party discipline, anti-bribery laws, and the rigidity of the overall system;” but post-Soviet era, 
the sheer size of potential rents and the demise of the Communist party removed key constraints 
to rent-seeking behavior by state enterprise managers and other government officials (Kaufmann 
and Siegelbaum 1997, 423). Some privatization projects were even setup to be corrupt. In the so-
called “loans-for-shares program,” Russian oligarchs bought up government debt in return for 
state assets shares; as state assets were transferred below their actual value, oligarchs in return 
financed the political campaign of the Kremlin (King and Treskow 2006).  
In sub-Saharan Africa—a region where ethnic allegiances dominate national identities—high-
level state personnel have worked to manage privatization to the benefit of the well-connected few 
(Tangri and Mwenda 2001, 132). Public bureaucrats had wide discretion to ensure that their loyal 
supporters benefited most, for example in Kenya (Bennell 1997), Ghana (Appiah-Kubi 2001), and 
Uganda (Mwenda and Tangri 2005). The lack of transparency in the privatization programs of 
Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Mozambique also enabled officials to accrue private benefits 
(Bennell 1997). In most cases, perpetrators of corruption crimes were never prosecuted (Tangri 
and Mwenda 2001). 
6 
 
In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela have had privatization episodes that 
led to increasing corruption (Manzetti and Blake 1996). Corruption was particularly rampant 
where executives had discretionary power to implement economic reform. Corruption scandals 
flourished in the wake of little parliamentary control and weak legal frameworks. Moreover, 
privatization did not remove the potential for corrupt behavior but merely changed its modalities. 
Under public ownership, enterprises had access to the general state budget, and corruption would 
impact public contracts and hiring decisions. Under private ownership, however, these enterprises 
lacked access to state funds but sought continued protection by bribing officials to bend rules and 
devise arbitrary regulations for competing firms. This created popular dissatisfaction with the 
privatization process, despite higher levels of investment after privatization (Martimort and Straub 
2009).  
In East Asia, the corruption-inducing effect of privatization is comparatively less well-established. 
For example, Vietnam was urged to reform the state-owned enterprise sector and to adopt various 
measures to speed up equitization—a form of privatization that entails removing state control over 
productive establishments and placing those assets into publicly traded stock (Painter 2005, 270–
71). While this process faced several obstacles—including technical and legal difficulties—the 
main impediment was that most of the potential purchasers were existing managers and 
employees who, in most cases, already enjoyed informal ownership rights (Gainsborough 2002, 
358–60). Manager-owners of these semi-privatized entities were not prepared to surrender the 
advantages of state-owned enterprises, such as entitlement to land ownership, easier access to 
loans, benefits for employees, and employment security, and thus preserved their privileges 
through corruption (Fforde 2002). 
There is also anecdotal evidence of a link between IMF privatization programs and increased 
corruption. Consider the case of Albania. Between 1993 and 2001, the country faced 27 
privatization conditions, many of which were binding and seven required full implementation 
even before Albania was able to access any IMF loans (so-called ‘prior actions’). In 1993, the 
Fund mandated the Albanian government to “privatize (fully or as joint ventures) or liquidate all 
state farms” (IMF 1993). In 1994, it requested the “liquidation of three firms identified by the 
Enterprise Restructuring Agency (ERA)” and related action plans for at least five other firms. In 
1998, under a new IMF agreement, the government needed to obtain parliamentary approval of its 
privatization strategy and “liquidate all former ERA enterprises” (IMF 1998). In 1999, the Fund 
required the “sale of at least 50 SMEs” and the “holding of auctions for at least 90 SMEs” (IMF 
1999). As privatization progressed, corruption control deteriorated according to widely used 
related measures. For instance, the ICRG corruption control index deteriorated from 4.00 in 1993, 
to 3.83 in 1995, and 2.00 in 2000, and further to 1.83 in 2005. Similarly, the VDem Public Sector 
Corruption Index—measuring the extent to which “public sector employees grant favors in 
exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements […] and steal, embezzle, or 
misappropriate public funds” (Coppedge et al. 2016, 67)—increased from 0.46 in 1995 to 0.63 in 
2000. In other words, corruption perceptions increased precisely when privatization was at its 
peak (Figure 1). Although this correlation is merely suggestive, it shows that our hypothesis is 
entirely plausible.  
[Figure 1 here] 
The case of Albania is not unique. By the late-1980s, the IMF—and other international financial 
institutions—had made privatization conditions a requirement for most adjustment loans (Brune, 
Garrett, and Kogut 2004), with such conditions becoming ubiquitous over the 1990s and beyond 
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(Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King 2016). In many cases, IMF conditionality has played a pivotal role 
in jump-starting privatization (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; 
Hilson 2004).  
A key weakness of the IMF’s role in privatization is the insufficient attention to the broader 
institutional framework required to prevent corruption increases (Manzetti and Blake 1996; 
Mwenda and Tangri 2005). The timing of privatization reforms was often problematic. For 
example, in the former Soviet countries, privatization was mandated at a time when “fiduciary 
controls that ordinarily operate to ensure that government transactions are fair and transparent 
have been largely crippled” (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997, 421). To ensure quick 
implementation of its conditions, the IMF often turned a blind eye on irregularities as long as 
authorities implemented other parts of its market-liberalizing agenda (Tangri and Mwenda 2001, 
130). Last, the Fund did not give adequate advice on how to privatize well, ignoring evidence that 
different ways of privatization have different effects on corruption (Irdam, Scheiring, and King 
2015); for example, privatization involving international tenders and firm liquidation might be 
less prone to corruption than other modes of privatization (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997).  
In sum, case studies provide evidence of the corruption-inducing effects of privatization, and 
demonstrate that IMF conditionality has often been crucial for the initiation of privatization 
programs. Linking these two bases of evidence, we hypothesize that IMF-promoted privatization 
increases corruption. Going beyond case studies, we present the first systematic cross-national 
quantitative analysis on the privatizations–corruption relationship.  
 
3.  Data and methods  
We analyze the relationship between IMF conditions and corruption control using time-series 
cross-section analysis at the country level. Our sample includes 141 developing countries 
observed from 1982 to 2014. Developing countries hereby refer to all non-high income countries 
according to the World Bank definition.1 Due to missing values in the control variables, panels are 
unbalanced and include up to 99 countries.  
Dependent variables 
Our key dependent variable is CONTROL OF CORRUPTION from ICRG. This perception-based 
indicator is widely used among scholars studying corruption (e.g., Adserà et al. 2003; Sandholtz 
and Gray 2003; Larraín and Tavares 2004; Dreher and Siemers 2009) and coincides with our 
definition of corruption presented earlier. The measure assigns low values when there is 
widespread “financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, 
or loans” (The PRS Group 2015, 4). 
We use alternative measures of corruption for robustness tests: the Transparency International’s 
(TI) corruption perception index,2 the VDem project corruption index (Coppedge et al. 2016, 66), 
and the HRV government transparency index (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2014). While 
the former are at the heart of our argument about rent creation in the government sector, the latter 
                                                          
1
 Developing countries have per-capita income below US$ 12,736.  
2
 https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (accessed June 10, 2018). 
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captures what is possibly a key facilitator for corruption to thrive—lack of transparency (Gaspar 
and Hagan 2016, 17). 
Among the indicators suitable for time-series cross-section analysis, the TI index is widely known 
among practitioners, while the VDem measure has greater coverage.3 The main drawback of the 
ICRG, TI, and VDem measures are that they are based on subjective ratings and may suffer from 
perception biases. For example, while ICRG variables seek to capture risks for investors and 
hence reflect biases in the business community, VDem measures are created by country experts 
with social sciences training. Consequently, in using different subjective measures, we hedge 
against specific biases. In addition, government transparency—capturing the extent to which 
countries report data to the World Bank—promises to be a relatively bias-free indicator as it is 
based on observational data. While perception-based indicators have recently been criticized 
(Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014; Stubbs, King, and Stuckler 2014), scholars have attempted to directly 
measure corruption, for example by examining irregularities in public procurement (Fazekas and 
King 2018; Fazekas and Kocsis 2017; Olken and Pande 2012). We cannot use procurement-based 
measures here because the relevant data are not available for a wide range of countries.  
Key predictors 
Our analysis hinges on the ability to measure the number of IMF conditions in specific policy 
areas. For that purpose, we rely on information from a newly constructed database on IMF 
conditionality based on our coding of individual conditions from all IMF agreements with 
borrowers from 1980 to 2014 (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). Our key predictor is the 
number of binding conditions in an IMF program requiring privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Consistent with previous scholarship, we use binding conditions as they determine 
actual disbursements of scheduled loans (Copelovitch 2010; Rickard and Caraway 2018; Stubbs et 
al. 2017). Privatization conditions became integrated into IMF programs after the end of the Cold 
War, reflecting the creation of newly independent states in Eastern Europe, while reaching their 
peak at the millennium turn and declining thereafter.  
In addition, we include a binary indicator for an IMF PROGRAM being active in a given year. If 
jointly included with a condition count, the coefficient estimate on the program dummy will 
capture all remaining aspects of IMF programs, including financial resources, technical assistance, 
and signaling effects. In the robustness checks, we also juxtapose privatization conditions against 
other policy areas available from the IMF conditionality database. 
Control variables 
A significant body of scholarship focuses on the long-run macro-historical determinants of 
corruption, including colonial history, legal origin, latitude, religion, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000), and political-system features such as 
federalism, presidentialism, and proportional representation (Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003). Yet 
others argue that mass education over a century ago was critical to building capable states and to 
giving citizens more opportunities for opposing corruption (Uslaner and Rothstein 2016). 
                                                          
3
 The World Bank Governance Indicators measure on corruption control was not designed for use in panel data 
analysis, as its values cannot be compared across time. By choosing indicators with broad cross-country 
coverage, we also minimize (to the extent possible) the risk of bias due to non-random missing data. 
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Since these determinants are time-invariant in our sample period, we control for these using a 
series of country dummies and focus on time-varying correlates of corruption control. An initial 
control variable for corruption is GDP PER CAPITA, given that level of development closely relates 
to efficient institutions.4 We take the logarithm of this variable to remove skewness.  
Control of corruption is also affected by political factors. Democratic governance can increase the 
likelihood of exposing corrupt practices and hence reduce incentives for state bureaucrats to ask 
for bribes (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Larraín and Tavares 2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002). To 
capture constitutional guarantees for political rights, we use the POLITY IV INDEX. We also 
consider REGIME DURABILITY from the Polity IV dataset—the number of years that the current 
political order has survived since the last transformation—to account for deep legacies of political 
systems (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston 2009; Jetter, Agudelo, and Hassan 2015).  
In addition, we consider a series of variables that capture opportunities for rent-seeking. The 
degree of URBANIZATION may affect corruption because the higher the concentration of the 
population in urban areas increases opportunities for interaction between bribe takers and bribe 
givers (Billger and Goel 2009). We also use MINERAL RENTS (as a percentage of GDP), as well as 
the (natural logarithm) of OIL PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (Treisman 2000; Adserà et al. 2003; 
Fréchette 2006). According to proponents of the ‘resources curse’, countries relying on natural 
resources are particularly vulnerable to corruption given the geographic concentration of such 
resources and the adverse effects of natural resource endowments on government accountability 
(Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Mahdavy 1970; Ross 2001). Detailed definitions 
and data sources for all variables can be found in appendix B. Descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
In addition to country-fixed effects and control variables, we include year dummies to net out the 
impact of factors that may affect corruption equally across countries. Employing fixed-effect 
estimation can mitigate potential bias due to unobserved time-invariant variables.5 We also report 
robust standard errors clustered by country, given that errors of within-country time series might 
be correlated.6 
Methods 
A well-known inferential challenge is non-random assignment of countries to IMF programs. For 
instance, countries with corruption problems may be more likely to require IMF assistance, 
thereby implying a problem of reverse causality. We tackle this challenge by estimating a probit 
selection model for IMF programs using a well-established set of variables recommended by the 
literature. We include PAST PROGRAMS, a count variable for the prior years of IMF exposure over 
a five-year horizon. Previous exposure is a reliable predictor of current participation (Bird, 
Hussain, and Joyce 2004; Copelovitch 2010). Program participation is also affected by the extent 
to which the Fund has resources available, which depends on the current number of borrowing 
                                                          
4
 GDP per capita might not be fully exogenous with respect to corruption (Treisman 2000), but there is no 
satisfactory solution to address the problem (Fréchette 2006). Following Jetter and colleagues (2015), we 
replaced GDP per capita with life expectancy but obtained very similar results. Therefore, we simply report 
regressions with GDP per capita here.  
5
 We also conducted a Hausman test, which rejected the use of random-effect estimation (p<0.001).  
6
 We reject the null hypothesis of ‘no autocorrelation’ using the Wooldridge test (p<0.001). 
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countries (Vreeland 2003). Hence, we include the contemporaneous count variable COUNTRIES 
UNDER PROGRAMS. In addition, as allies of big powers receive favorable treatment by IFIs 
(Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2015; Thacker 1999), we measure the alignment of voting patterns 
between the borrowing country and the G7 countries in the United Nations General Assembly—
UNGA VOTE ALIGNMENT (Strezhnev and Voeten 2013).7 Additional variables capture 
macroeconomic conditions—logged GDP PER CAPITA, GDP GROWTH, RESERVES in months of 
imports, and DEBT SERVICE (as percentage of GNI)—as well as political characteristics—
democracy, measured by the POLITY IV INDEX, and EXECUTIVE ELECTIONS—that have been 
previously found to affect program participation.8 We also include regional dummies and year 
dummies (since country-fixed effects cannot be included in a probit-type model).  
Another concern is endogeneity of conditionality, for example due to reverse causality. To 
address endogeneity, we need instruments for IMF conditions—variables that partially correlate 
with IMF conditionality but whose impact on corruption control only operates through 
conditionality. Finding excludable instruments presents a formidable challenge, especially if we 
need generally valid instruments for IMF conditions across different policy areas.  
Our instrumentation strategy borrows from recent practice in development effectiveness research 
(Lang 2016; Nunn and Qian 2014). For each type of condition, we construct a compound 
instrument based on the interaction of the within-country average number of these conditions and 
the period-specific budget constraint of the Fund as measured by the number of COUNTRIES 
UNDER PROGRAMS. The instrument fulfils the relevance criterion because when the IMF assists 
more countries in any period, resource scarcity prompts the organization to assign more 
conditions to any given country as a safeguard measure (Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Lang 2016; 
Vreeland 2003).9 The instrument likely fulfills the exclusion restriction because deviations of a 
country’s number of conditions from its long-run average are not due to a country’s institutional 
features but the IMF’s decision to require more safeguards when its global budget constraint 
becomes more binding. Conditional on controls and country-fixed effects, we cannot think of any 
direct pathway from the IMF’s budget constraint to corruption control other than through 
conditionality.  
The compound instrumentation strategy offers the advantage that we do not need to find specific 
instruments for different types of conditions. The drawback is that not all areas of conditionality 
are equally strongly subjected to the budget-constraint logic described here, which may result in 
weak-instrument bias (though we confirm through F-tests that this is not an issue). We 
acknowledge that endogeneity of conditions remains a challenge,10 and we address this issue again 
                                                          
7
 Selection models are more robust when they have an exclusion restriction. In our case, COUNTRIES UNDER 
PROGRAMS is plausibly excludable, whereas UNGA voting alignment—the variable conventionally used as 
instrument in the IMF program literature—is not because countries in which corruption is endemic will also be 
more likely to accept bribes by powerful donors. 
8
 While IMF programs are less likely in democracies because leaders must fear electoral punishment, they are 
more likely after elections—when electoral pressures have waned. Both economic fundamentals and political 
variables are lagged one period further than the lag of IMF PROGRAM. 
9
 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) show that bigger loans come with more conditions attached, since the Fund has more 
of its assets at stake and thus requires more safeguards. We generalize this argument to the number of loan 
programs, which should positively relate to the size of loans under management. 
10
 Previous studies suggest some excludable instruments for IMF program participation (Dreher, Sturm, and 
Vreeland 2015; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Vreeland 2003), loan size (Copelovitch 2010), and the number 
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in the robustness tests by probing robustness of our findings to a different instrument 
specification. 
As our statistical model includes three equations—corruption control (the ultimate outcome), IMF 
PROGRAM (a binary outcome), and the number of privatization conditions—we estimate 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions using maximum likelihood and allow for correlated standard 
errors across equations and clustering on countries (Roodman 2012). The latter choice also 
mitigates temporal autocorrelation in the standard errors. In the context of research on the 
effectiveness of IMF interventions, this method yields consistent estimates for a broad range of 
scenarios (Stubbs et al. 2018).  
 
4.  Findings 
Main results 
Table 2 examines the impact of privatization conditions and other aspects of IMF programs on the 
control of corruption, showing the full results of all stages in the system of equations. Each 
column corresponds to a different lag of the variables of interest, which enables us to study the 
impact of conditionality under different time horizons and thus to better test the observable 
implications of our theoretical argument. Since all our estimations include fixed effects for 
individual countries, results must be interpreted as within-country effects. 
[Table 2 here] 
We find that privatization adversely affects corruption control from the second year of an IMF 
program onwards. One additional privatization condition is predicted to reduce corruption control 
by at least 0.31 points (p<0.1); the index ranges from 0 to 6 and its standard deviation is 0.99. For 
purposes of comparison, it would require full-blown autocratization—a fifteen-point decline in the 
Polity IV index—to exert a similarly adverse effect on corruption control.11 While the effect 
becomes substantively larger for deeper lags, it remains only weakly statistically significant. We 
find no significant effects for the remaining aspects of IMF programs. 
Diagnostic statistics suggest that our model specifications are appropriate. While some of the 
control variables lack statistical significance, their estimated effects all have the expected 
direction. The only exception is GDP per capita, which is insignificant.12 Democratization 
positively relates to corruption control. Higher regime durability also tends to relate to better 
control of corruption, though the effect is mostly not statistically significant. The negative 
coefficient of urbanization is never significant. Consistent with studies on the resource curse, 
higher non-tax income from mineral rents reduces the control of corruption, as does an increase in 
oil production.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of conditions (Dreher 2006); but there is only limited research on the determinants of specific types of conditions 
that might yield generally valid instruments (Rickard and Caraway 2018). 
11
 The appendix also presents our findings on a standardized dataset, which can facilitate direct comparisons 
between effect sizes (and across different outcomes) but raises difficulties of interpretation in terms of the 
substantive effects for some variables.   
12
 As discussed in footnote 4, this most likely is due to reverse causality; moreover, the use of fixed effects 
absorbs the level effect that one would find when using a pooled estimator.  
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For completeness, we also discuss the results of the auxiliary equations. In the selection equation 
for IMF programs, coefficient estimates have the expected direction (Moser and Sturm 2011; 
Vreeland 2003; Woo 2013), and are highly stable for all variables. For example, program 
participation is explained by the number of past programs, the level of socioeconomic 
development, the number of countries under program, and the strategic alignment of a country 
with the G7. Moreover, indicators of economic crises such as low growth, few reserves, and high 
debt service can also explain program participation. While democracy is not statistically 
significant, we find some evidence that countries are more likely to seek programs after an 
executive election.  
In the conditionality equation, we find a strongly significant effect of the compound instrument, 
which underscores its relevance with respect to the number of privatization conditions. In 
addition, privatization conditions are more likely to be extended to countries experiencing 
reductions in their per-capita income, increases in the longevity of their regimes, and reductions in 
oil production. Most of the variation, however, is absorbed by country dummies and year 
dummies.  
Diagnostic statistics suggest that our model specifications are appropriate. The best-fitting models 
for corruption control explain about 30% of the within-country variation. In addition, there is little 
indication of weak instruments. According to the conventional rule of thumb, the Kleibergen-Paap 
F-statistic should pass the value of ten (Stock and Staiger 1997), which would guarantee that the 
bias due to weak instruments is relatively small compared to the bias due to endogeneity (Stock 
and Yogo 2005). In our case, the F-statistic on the compound instruments for privatization is 
beyond this threshold (F>86). 
Mechanisms 
Having established a relationship between privatization conditions and declining corruption 
control, we seek further support for our posited mechanism in two ways. First, a necessary 
condition for our mechanism to be at work is that countries actually implement privatization 
programs. To account for potential non-compliance with IMF conditionality, we remove 
conditions from the condition count that are waived by the Executive Board. A condition may be 
waived by a simple majority vote among member states in the Board following a related proposal 
by IMF staff (Copelovitch 2010, 60). Taking waivers into account should strengthen coefficient 
estimates because it removes a subset of conditions which may not have been met. When doing 
so, we find more consistent evidence for the negative effect of privatization conditions on 
perceived control of corruption. In the fifth year following a program, the effect is strongest—
about 0.37 points less corruption control for every condition (p<0.05). Conversely, other areas of 
conditionality remain statistically insignificant (Table 3).  
[Table 3 here] 
Second, we verify that our effects are genuinely driven by privatization conditions, rather than 
IMF conditionality more generally. To that end, we include the number of conditions in four other 
policy areas: revenues, public sector employment, price liberalization, and trade liberalization. 
IMF research considers these the most beneficial policy areas towards corruption abatement. To 
account for potential endogeneity of these conditions, we adopt the same compound 
instrumentation strategy as before, using the interaction of the country-specific average number of 
conditions and the time-varying global number of IMF countries. As a result, privatization 
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conditions continue to exert a negatively significant effect on corruption control (Table 4). Effect 
magnitudes remain stable, which lends support to our hypothesized mechanism. Juxtaposing 
privatization against other policy areas yields additional insights, confirming that not all IMF 
policies are uniformly detrimental. For instance, price liberalization has a beneficial impact on 
corruption control (p<0.05), as does trade liberalization (p<0.1). However, as we show in the 
supplemental appendix, these effects are not robust to alternative model choices. 
[Table 4 here] 
Robustness tests 
In the supplemental appendix, we conduct robustness tests and report briefly on the results here. 
In Table A1, we use alternative dependent variables. First, using TI’s corruption perception index, 
we find a marginally significant deterioration of perceived transparency due to privatization 
conditions after one year (p<0.10). Second, using the VDem corruption index (Coppedge et al. 
2016, 66), privatization significantly increases corruption, especially in the first two years 
(p<0.05) but also in the third year (p<0.1). Hence, among all perception-based indicators, the 
VDem corruption index yields the most significant findings. This could reflect potential biases in 
the ICRG measure, which is produced by business experts who tend to ascribe to market-
liberalizing measures the ability to abate corruption (Stubbs, King, and Stuckler 2014). The 
VDem index is less likely to suffer from such bias as it is based on expert surveys beyond the 
business sector. Third, using the HRV government transparency measure (Hollyer, Rosendorff, 
and Vreeland 2014), we find that privatization reduces government transparency after two years, 
while other aspects of IMF intervention improve it.  
Table A2 uses an alternative operationalization for the time-varying component of the compound 
instrument. In particular, we replace the number of countries under programs by the average 
number of conditions in a specific policy area in a given year and interact this part with the 
country-specific average number of conditionality over the entire sample period. This compound 
instrument is plausibly excludable because changes in the country-specific number of conditions 
are brought about by changes in the global popularity of certain conditions (‘policy fads’)—which 
is out of the control of individual countries and not directly related to their corruption control. 
This reasoning is plausible, as the example of IFI-promoted tax policy convergence suggests 
(Swank 2016). We find consistent support for a corruption-inducing effect of privatization 
conditions (p<0.05), while price liberalization tends to improve corruption control (p<0.1). 
Table A3 alters the estimate of interest by comparing IMF countries with specific conditions to 
IMF countries without such conditions. By removing all country-year observations without IMF 
programs, we thus change the baseline for comparison. This simplifies the estimation as it 
removes one equation. We find that privatization exerts a significantly negative impact on 
corruption control, especially in later years. Substantively, one condition has an effect of 0.43 
after five years (p<0.05)—which is in the order of magnitude of the previous analysis. None of 
the other conditions are significant.  
Table A4 probes robustness to dynamic estimation using Error Correction Models (ECMs). In 
these models, the dependent variable is the change of corruption control, regressed on its lagged 
level, and levels and changes of all predictors. The benefit of ECMs is to provide a flexible model 
14 
 
structure to uncover dynamic relationships, though at the cost of additional complexity.13 As 
reflected in the respective coefficients on the differenced variables, none of the conditions exerts 
an instantaneous effect on corruption control. The same holds for other elements of IMF 
assistance beyond conditionality. In contrast, we find that most conditions have negative long-
term implications for corruption control. This is particularly the case for privatization: one 
privatization condition reduces long-term corruption control by 1.69 points14 (p<0.01). This result 
is consistent with our previous findings obtained from a simpler statistical model.15  
Finally, we examine how total government expenditure—a potential result of revenue-increasing 
privatization—co-determines corruption (Table A5). Raising government spending can increase 
corruption because such spending creates new rents to be captured (Dzhumashev 2014a, 2014b). 
While we excluded government spending earlier to mitigate post-treatment bias, we now include 
it to test whether spending shocks affect the privatization–corruption link. We find that spending 
levels are not related to corruption but that aggregate spending shocks are positively related to 
corruption control (p<0.1). We also tested the effect of military expenditures on corruption 
(Hudson and Jones 2008), finding faster growth of military spending significantly decreases 
corruption control (p<0.05), and attenuates the effect of privatization, which becomes statistically 
insignificant. This could be interpreted as evidence that privatization generates new rents that 
governments put into the military, which is an indication of which groups stand to gain from 
privatization due to their connections to government and thus consistent with our argument. These 
findings also are in line with earlier studies showing that corruption distorts public expenditures, 
typically to the detriment of social protection and to the detriment of economic performance 
(Delavallade 2006; Hessami 2014; Hudson and Jones 2008; Del Monte and Pagani 2001; 
Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). 
In sum, our analysis suggests that IMF-induced privatizations decrease control of corruption in the 
developing world. As summarized in Table 5, this result is robust against alternative measures of 
corruption, different operationalization of predictors, model specifications, and estimation 
methods.  
[Table 5 here] 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Using new IMF conditionality data, we found that IMF conditions mandating privatization of 
state-owned enterprises decrease corruption control. This effect is tangible and holds in most 
estimations examining different outcome measures (both corruption perceptions and objective 
                                                          
13
 Political methodologists continue to debate under which conditions ECMs are appropriate, which is why we 
use them only for robustness tests (Beck and Katz 2011; Boef and Keele 2008; Grant and Lebo 2016). And yet, 
ECMs are still preferable to an atheoretical lagged dependent variable model, which would generate biased 
estimates in our case (Nickell 1981). 
14
 Taking the long-term coefficient on this condition and divide by the absolute value of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable (i.e., (-0.25)/0.15=1.69). 
15
 We decided to use ECMs for robustness checks only as the discussion on their use cases is ongoing. To some 
methodologists, ECMs provide a flexible estimation structure even in the absence of co-integration relationships 
(Beck and Katz 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008), while others contest the use of ECMs as a single-step 
estimation method (Grant and Lebo 2016). 
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indicators), an alternative operationalization of conditions, and estimation techniques. While our 
main analysis focuses on short-term effects up to five years, we obtain even stronger long-term 
effects in a dynamic model. In addition, we find some corruption-reducing effects of other 
market-liberalizing policy conditions, but these effects are not robust across different models.  
We interpret these results as evidence that privatization creates highly concentrated rents that 
increase corruption risks, while at the same time creating incentives among rent-seeking elites to 
weaken state capacity. This leads to a vicious circle of weakening institutions and increasing 
corruption, which is hard to break because corruption is a collective action dilemma (Persson, 
Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Concerning the lack of robust support for other areas of 
conditionality, we speculate that IMF conditions seeking to abolish rents are not always successful 
because governments may find other ways to redistribute wealth to influential groups (Coate and 
Morris 1995), which tends to mitigate the positive effect on corruption control. It may also be 
harder to control corruption when states are reduced to essential functions (Persson and Rothstein 
2015). 
Before turning to policy implications and avenues for future research, we discuss three limitations 
of our study. First, our main results are based on a rather narrow (yet widely used) definition of 
corruption and subjective measurements of perceived corruption control—which is a concession 
to data availability. However, we have also considered government transparency as an objective 
alternative outcome. Second, missing data is a potential problem for all large-N social science 
research such as ours. Lacking a statistical fix to the issue of missing data in the context of 
multiple-equation models, we have sought to address this challenge by using corruption variables 
with broad cross-country coverage, thus minimizing threats to external validity due to missing 
data series. Third, while we have employed the best-available methods to address potential 
endogeneity of conditionality, a causal interpretation of our results rests on the excludability of 
our compound instruments. In view of the qualitative evidence, the argument that privatization 
induces corruption is entirely plausible.  
In terms of policy implications, our findings corroborate the view that market-liberalizing policy 
packages are unlikely to be uniformly beneficial (Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose 2007). In fact, we 
find that privatization undermines corruption control, while other types of market-liberalizing 
conditions do not have the hoped-for effects of reducing corruption. Our study hence questions 
the role of IFIs in the advancement of corruption control, particularly when the primary goal of 
such IFIs is to liberalize markets and reduce the role of the state in the economy. While IMF 
researchers have begun to acknowledge the potential dangers of promoting privatization (Gaspar 
and Hagen 2016, 22), such statements are lacking in official IMF publications (IMF 2017). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine why the IMF is clinging on to its 
positive view on privatization, we can draw on established scholarship to intuit the IMF’s 
behavior. A number of studies have examined change and stability in the IMF’s policy paradigms, 
specifically after the Global Financial Crisis, finding that change occurred more in rhetoric than in 
action (Ban 2015; Broome 2015; Gabor 2015). As emphasized by recent scholarship 
(Baumgartner 2012; Béland and Cox 2013; Blyth 2012), paradigm change is rare, especially when 
no counter-paradigm has emerged and the organizational leadership has vested interests in 
maintaining the old paradigm.  
We identify at least three areas of further inquiry for future research. First, while our goal here 
was to theorize on the effect of privatization on corruption and to quantify the associated effects, 
further work would be welcome for related areas of market-liberalizing policy reform. For 
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instance, public-sector conditions often mandate countries to reduce the attractiveness of public 
sector jobs (Rickard and Caraway 2018), and capital account liberalization may allow corrupt 
elites to move corrupt funds offshore (Brown and Cloke 2004). In addition, in view of criticisms 
that privatization is detrimental in certain policy environments and regulatory contexts, further 
research may examine how context moderates the effect of privatization on corruption. While 
researchers concur that IFI pressure often initiates privatization programs (Brune, Garrett, and 
Kogut 2004), their modalities are often determined by domestic characteristics, for example 
political ideology (Martinez-Gallardo and Murillo 2011). Future research could collect detailed 
data on the regulatory aspects of privatization programs to inform policy practice on how to avoid 
corruption in such cases. 
Second, we did not explicitly test whether IMF anti-corruption conditions effectively reduce 
corruption. While this inquiry would encounter irresolvable endogeneity issues, our findings 
suggest that a potentially beneficial effect of such conditions would be insufficient to compensate 
for the detrimental effects of privatization conditions. The relative ineffectiveness of anti-
corruption measures is not surprising because the IMF—in addition to its commitment to the 
transactional approach to corruption—remains skeptical about states’ willingness and ability to 
reduce corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). While increased state capacity could help overcome 
corruption problems, the Fund has promoted corruption-abatement through reducing government 
expenditure and promoting market-liberalizing reforms (Brown and Cloke 2004, 286). In doing 
so, the Fund mistakes that reducing the role of the state does not eliminate corruption, but likely 
shifts the locus of corruption into the private sector (Goldsmith 1999; Kohl 2002; Manzetti and 
Blake 1996). 
Ultimately, the key policy question is why the Fund continues to advocate privatization despite 
evidence for the harmfulness of such policies in developing countries. We thus encourage 
researchers to examine the sources of stability in IMF policy advice on market-liberalizing 
reforms. This entails research on the political economy of international organizations examining 
who governs these organizations and how power asymmetries affect policy outcomes (Halliday 
and Block-Lieb 2009; Halliday, Pacewicz, and Block-Lieb 2013; Stone 2013). The issue can also 
be examined through the lens of policy paradigms (Babb and Chorev 2016; Broome, Homolar, 
and Kranke 2018; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017). Such paradigms are hard to overturn as long 
as there is no consistent alternative to replace them and if leadership to actively reconstruct 
paradigms is lacking. Such conditions are likely to be met in hierarchical organizations with 
homogenous professional backgrounds, such as the Fund. While scholars have studied IMF 
paradigm change in fiscal policy (Ban 2015; Ban and Gallagher 2015; Clift and Tomlinson 2011), 
a similar analysis on ‘good governance’ is missing. Text-as-data analysis of policy speeches and 
IMF publications could be used to track potential early signs of changing rhetoric on anti-
corruption. Findings from such an exercise would help us better understand why the IMF’s 
approach to corruption has not substantively changed since the organization first adopted the staff 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
Corruption indicators      
Control of corruption  2654 2.414 0.990 0.000 6.000 
Corruption perception index (TI) 1732 31.028 10.729 4.000 71.000 
Corruption index (VDem) 3915 0.631 0.206 0.079 0.969 
Government transparency 2852 0.549 1.856 -7.052 9.981 
Key predictors      
IMF program 4612 0.396 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Privatization 4577 0.079 0.482 0.000 8.000 
Revenues 4577 0.324 1.277 0.000 21.000 
Public sector 4577 0.154 0.766 0.000 24.000 
Price liberalization 4577 0.208 1.004 0.000 28.000 
Trade liberalization 4577 0.824 1.819 0.000 28.000 
Control variables      
Log(GDP per capita) 4221 7.154 1.045 4.242 9.661 
Regime durability 3758 16.174 17.664 0.000 105.000 
Polity IV index 3684 0.560 6.620 -10.000 10.000 
Urbanization 4810 43.155 19.927 4.339 91.604 
Mineral rents (% GDP) 4207 1.289 3.767 0.000 44.644 





Table 2: Privatization conditions and corruption control. 
  t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 
Corruption control 
     Privatization conditions -0.268 -0.310* -0.348*   -0.366* -0.387*   
 
(0.172) (0.187) (0.199)    (0.206) (0.203)    
IMF program -0.047 -0.042 -0.076    -0.094 -0.154    
 
(0.152) (0.156) (0.148)    (0.140) (0.131)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.164 -0.182 -0.216    -0.259 -0.304    
 
(0.219) (0.218) (0.215)    (0.220) (0.234)    
Regime durability 0.008* 0.007 0.006    0.006 0.006    
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)    (0.006) (0.006)    
Polity IV index 0.025** 0.022* 0.021*   0.018 0.017    
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)    (0.012) (0.012)    
Urbanization -0.011 -0.009 -0.006    -0.003 0.002    
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)    (0.016) (0.016)    
Mineral rents -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.045**  -0.041** -0.039**  
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)    (0.018) (0.017)    
Log(Oil per capita) -0.588 -0.633* -0.657**  -0.663** -0.584**  
 
(0.358) (0.339) (0.315)    (0.286) (0.259)    
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2252 2243 2231 2219 2153 
Within-R2 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 
IMF program           
Past programs 0.368*** 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.374*** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)    (0.024) (0.025)    
UNGA vote alignment 3.422*** 3.515*** 3.514*** 3.571*** 4.122*** 
 
(0.890) (0.885) (0.949)    (0.992) (1.131)    
Countries under programs -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.009) (0.009)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.339*** -0.349*** -0.347*** -0.336*** -0.319*** 
 
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078)    (0.077) (0.076)    
Polity IV index 0.002 0.000 -0.001    -0.003 -0.006    
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    (0.010) (0.010)    
Reserves -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)    (0.022) (0.024)    
GDP growth -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.008) (0.008)    
Debt service  0.027*** 0.030*** 0.030**  0.028** 0.026**  
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)    (0.012) (0.011)    
Executive elections 0.078 0.096 0.139*   0.149* 0.139    
 
(0.080)     (0.082) (0.083)    (0.083)   (0.089)   
Region-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2252 2243 2231 2219 2153 
Pseudo-R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Privatization conditions           
Compound instrument 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)    (0.009) (0.009)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.071 -0.079 -0.091*   -0.107* -0.119**  
 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.053)    (0.057) (0.059)    
Regime durability 0.001* 0.001** 0.001**  0.002** 0.002**  
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    
Polity IV index 0.001 0.001 0.002    0.002 0.003    
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)    
Urbanization 0.002 0.002 0.002    0.002 0.002    
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)    
27 
Mineral rents -0.002 -0.002 -0.001    -0.001 0.002    
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.004) (0.004)    
Log(Oil per capita) -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.167*** -0.163*** 
 
(0.053)  (0.056) (0.056)    (0.057)     (0.053)   
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
F-statistic 114.89 99.45 98.83 99.09 111.71 
Observations 2252 2243 2231 2219 2153 
Within-R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 
      Notes: Multiple-equation instrumental-variable maximum-likelihood regression. All predictors are included at the lag specified in 
the column header. Each regression includes an IMF dummy which is instrumented with the selection equation shown. 
Privatization conditions are instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean of these conditions and the 
number of countries under IMF programs in a given year. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.  




Table 3: Implementation-corrected conditionality counts and corruption control.  
  t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 
Privatization conditions -0.287* -0.300* -0.327* -0.341* -0.380** 
 
(0.159) (0.164) (0.174) (0.176) (0.183) 
IMF program -0.010 -0.003 -0.060 -0.092 -0.163 
 
(0.184) (0.186) (0.168) (1.494) (0.135) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-R2 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 
Observations 2252 2243 2231 2219 2153 
F-statistic (mean) 108.61 108.16 108.37 109.07 111.57 
 
     Notes: Multiple-equation instrumental-variable maximum-likelihood regression. The table shows the outcome equation using 
'control of corruption'. All predictors are included at the lag specified in the column header. Each regression included an IMF 
dummy as a control variable, which was further modeled using a selection equation to take non-random selection into account. 
Privatization conditions only include non-waived conditions and are instrumented using the interaction between the country-
specific mean of these conditions and the number of countries under IMF programs in a given year. Robust standard errors 
clustered on countries in parentheses.  
Significance levels: * .1  ** .05  *** .01. 
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Table 4: Privatization conditions and other policy conditions. 
 









Privatization conditions -0.500*** -0.461* -0.570*** -0.434**  
 
(0.178)    (0.248) (0.208)    (0.202)    
Other policy conditions 0.276    0.390 0.510**  0.296*   
 
(0.195)    (0.374) (0.207)    (0.160)    
IMF program -0.032    -0.057 -0.053    -0.031    
 
(0.150)    (0.156) (0.146)    (0.147)    
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Within-R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Observations 2243 2243 2243 2243 
F-statistic (line 1) 110.94 106.28 122.36 127.64 
F-statistic (line 2) 4.79 11.52 7.43 18.38 
Notes: Multiple-equation instrumental-variable maximum-likelihood regression. The table shows the outcome equation using 
'corruption control' but suppresses control variables and all auxiliary equations. All predictors are included at their second lag. In 
each panel, regressions include an IMF dummy, which is instrumented using a standard probit selection equation. For each type 
of conditionality, the respective number of conditions is instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean of 
these conditions and the number of countries under IMF programs in a given year. Robust standard errors clustered on countries 
in parentheses.  






Table 5. IMF-mandated privatizations decrease control of corruption: summary of methods and findings. 
 
Dependent variable Key predictor Method to correct for possible endogeneity Main finding Source 
1) ICRG control of 
corruption 
a) Number of binding IMF 
privatization conditions 
i) Control function and instrumental-variable 
approach: IMF participation probit; IMF 
conditionality instrumented by interaction of 
mean conditions within country and number 
of countries under program. 
IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 








ii) As per i), plus controls for other policy 
area conditions (one per model) 
IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 
two years when controlling for revenue (p<0.01), 
public-sector employment (p<0.10), price liberalization 
(p<0.01), and trade liberalization (p<0.05). 
Table 4 
iii) As per i), but IMF conditionality 
instrumented by interaction of mean 
conditions within country and mean 
conditions across years 
IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 
two (p<0.10), three (p<0.10), four (p<0.10), and five 
(p<0.05) years. 
Table A2 
iv) Instrumental-variable approach for 
number of IMF conditions, but only among 
IMF program observations  
IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 
four (p<0.10) and five (p<0.05) years. 
Table A3 
v) Error Correction Model with control 
function and instrumental-variable approach 
IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption in the 
long-term (p<0.01). 
Table A4 
b) Number of binding IMF 
privatization conditions, 
deducting waived conditions 
As per i)  IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 
one (p<0.10), two (p<0.10), three (p<0.10), four 





As per a) As per i) IMF privatizations decrease control of corruption after 
one year (p<0.10). 
Table A1 
3) VDem corruption index IMF privatizations increase corruption after one 
(p<0.05), two (p<0.05), and three (p<0.10) years. 
4) HRV government 
transparency index 
IMF privatizations reduce transparency after two and 
three years (all p<0.10). 
 
 
